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1. INTRODUCTION
Technolpgy transfer issues have always been at the centre 
of discussions and efforts regarding the "new 
international order". The explanation for this is not too 
far to seek. The issue of access to, control and 
management of advanced technology is a matter which is 
central to contemporary international relations. 
Therefore in the Southern African context the legal 
regulation of advanced technology will remain a central 
consideration as new technologies become the centre piece 
in the struggle for power in an increasingly competitive 
regional system.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the prospects for 
the reorganization of regional and international economic 
relations in a manner which will reflect the interests of 
the SADCC member states. The paper deals with five
points.
First that the colonisation of Southern African States had 
^-the immediate consequence of incorporating them in the 
regional and international capitalist systems. The 
hegemonic role and presence of transnational corporations 
in the search for markets and sources of supply is
discussed. The observation is made that the exploitation 
of mineral and other resources has depended on the ability 
of the transnationals to dominate the regional process of 
technology production and distribution. The overall 
effect has been a massive dependence of black ruled 
Southern African countries on South Africa and their
existence as peripheral economies.
Secondly the paper outlines the contemporary legal 
infrastructure in SADCC countries with emphasis being 
placed on legal artifacts designed to accommodate regional 
and international capital. A key element in this legal
framework is the legal protection of monopoly rights in
/
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respect of technology. The legal effect of this 
protection is to facilitate cbncentration of technical 
know-how in the hands of the transnationals. The
concentration is further reinforced by a variety of legal 
instruments such as investment rules, international trade 
agreements,. tax treaties and constitutional provisions.
This discussion underlines the extent to which the 
distribution power (in favour of transnationals and the > 
centres of industrial power especially South Africa) and 
the nature of political systems have decisively determined 
the legal framework within which economic activity in 
general and transnational operations in particular have 
been carried on. Specific mention will be made of, inter 
alia; the Southern African Customs Union and the Rand 
Monetary Agreement. The point will be made that South 
Africa in general and South African based transnationals 
have been significantly aided by the Gustoms and Monetary 
regimes. The outcome of the legal infrastructure has been 
the maintenance of South Africa as the industrial core and 
the rest of Southern Africa as a periphery.
Thirdly the paper discusses the response by SADCC to this 
over-dependence and peripheral status. The SADCC response 
has included a varierty of strategies which have sought, 
inter alia, to accelerate industrialisation and reduce 
dependence. The SADCC strategies have been geared to the 
channeling of the forces of economic growth to the 
advantage of the SADCC member states. The observation is, \ 
however, made that in order to succeed in this respect, 
SADCC states must have a substantial technological base.
The transformation of SADCC frorif a peripheral status into 
a strong regional group capable of asserting its interests 
presupposes the ability to possess and control advanced 
technology, to generate own capital and provide managerial 
expertise. If the transformation was effectively
executed, the status of SADCC would be greatly enhanced 
thus enabling the group t<$ significantly undermine the 
economic order which to date has underwritten the
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framework within which transnationals have successfully 
functioned. '%
Fourth the paper points to the immense obstacles facing 
SADCC states in their quest for meaningful independence 
including an independent technological base in competition 
with transnationals. ' The observation is made that 
commercial and industrial activity in Southern Africa is a 
process of interaction involving a variety of actors, the 
major actors being the transnationals. The process of 
interaction results in a major disparity between Southern 
African black ruled states and the transnationals 
regarding control of technology as a source of power and 
wealth. The ability to participate effectively in 
commercial and industrial activity tends to link forward 
and backward to the existing stratified system, forward 
through the effect of better access to capital and 
technology and on the future fortunes of the actors and 
backward in time to the existing stratification system 
through the differential capabilities and resources of the 
actors. Traditional links mesh over time to form a rigid 
structure containing . two levels of access to
organizational ability, capital and technology: a circle 
of low status and low technological capacity (in this case 
the Southern African black ruled states) and a circle of 
high status which leads to favourable technological, 
organizational and capital opportunities that generate 
even higher' status (in this case in favour of the 
multinationals). In the context of Southern Africa the 
key question is whether possibilities exist for the black 
ruled states to break the status linkages ~'of the 
successive generations which have enabled transnationals 
to dominate the economic scene thanks to their control 
over advanced technology, managerial expertise and capital 
resources.
Finally the conclusion is made that though status linkages 
can be broken, the strategies which have been adopted by
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SADCC are unlikely to effectively break up such linkages. 
The proposition is advanced that since SADCC has eschewed 
high level integrative strategies and has preferred 
bilateral trade exchanges, the implication is that by 
design SADCC will not develop a central authority which is 
a prerequisite for off- setting the market forces that 
underwrite the hegemonic role of the transnationals. 
Lacking an integrated central authority the consequence 
will be the continued inability of national regimes to 
regulate enlarged mobility. „ Given that the Southern 
African scene is dominated by the mobile transnationals, 
which control the available pool of advanced technology, 
national policies will be ineffective in•exerting control.
The functional limitations of national regimes will be 
manifested by the degree to which SADCC oriented 
commitments will be honoured more in breach than in 
observance. The suggestion is made that consequential 
legal regulation of economic interaction with 
transnationals will require political will and willingness 
to make national sacrifices. . In particular the 
observation is made that the behaviour of Zimbabwe as the 
dominant economy will be decisive in the quest for a more 
meaningful and effective cooperative strategy.
2. COLONISATION AND CAPITALIST PENETRATION
The colonisation of Southern Africa at the end of the last 
century and beginning of this century resulted, inter 
alia, in the creation of a capitalist economy. The 
establishment of a capitalist etonomy was preceded by the 
establishment of a new form of legality which was designed 
to facilitate the operation of a market economy in which 
land, labour and capital would be allocated through "free" 
contractual exchanges. \
After the introduction of the legal and institutional 
framework for capitalist enterprise, international and 
regional capital commenced a process of penetration of
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Southern Africa with varrying degrees of intensity. When 
the black Southern African states achieved formal 
political independence, new economic and legal measures 
were adopted to encourage further participation of 
regional and international capital and technology in 
Southern African development.
3. THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CAPITALIST 
ENTERPRISE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
\
The technology, trade, investment, fiscal and monetary 
legal regimes of Southern African states, are characterised 
by a variety of rules designed to accommodate regional and 
international capital. The overall effect of these rules 
is to entrench the position of transnationals in the 
Southern African economies.
3.1 Monopoly Rights Over Technology
Most SADCC states have patent legislations designed to 
cover exclusive rights in respect of technology in 
accordance with the Paris Convention. The Paris 
Convention which was adopted at the 1883 Paris
International Conference seeks to establish norms and 
systems which are designed to provide protection to 
owners of technology.
The Paris Convention provides for a national treatment 
principle, which means that all individuals entitled to 
the benefits of the Convention are accorded the same 
protection which the laws of each member state grant to 
the citizen's of the member.
/
The Convention establishes the right of priority. In the 
absence of a right of priority, applications for patent 
rights had to be filed simultaneously in all countries 
otherwise the novelty of the invention would be lost by 
previous publicity effected by filing elsewhere. Thus
under the Convention, a filing in country X is recognised 
as a constructive filing in all countries even though no 
patent is granted in all countries.
In terms of the principle of the Independence of patents, 
patents applied for in the various contracting parties by 
individuals who are entitled to the benefits of the Paris 
Convention, are treated as independent patents granted 
for the same invention in other states whether members of 
the Union or not. In consequence the termination or 
forfeiture of patents in one country does not affect 
patents in another.
Monopoly rights under the Paris Convention are extended 
to industrial designs and models. The principles of 
national treatment, priority right and non-forfeiture of 
rights because of non-working are therefore applicable to 
designs.
At the national level, patent and copyright legislations 
have been enacted for the domestic implementation of the 
norms prescribed by the Paris Convention. The 
legislations are, however, an eloquent expression of the 
dependent relationship between Southern Africa and the 
centres of industrial power. For example the Botswana 
Patents and Designs Protection Act provides that the 
registered proprietor of any patent in /the United Kingdom 
shall enjoy the same rights in Botswana as though the 
patent granted or design registered in the United Kingdom 
had been granted with an extension to Botswana. The Act 
further provides that any person who is registered as a 
proprietor of a patent or design may, on production of 
the South African patent or the design registration 
certificate, be registered in the Botswana register. Upon 
registration the proprietor shall have and enjoy in 
Botswana the same rights and privileges as are. conferred 
upon him by the patent or design registration within 
South Africa. Such rights in Botswana shall subsist so
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long as the patent or design registration remains in 
force in South Africa.
3.2 Investment Rules
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and . Malawi 
maintain relatively open door policies towards private 
capita.l whether from local or foreign sources. Investment 
rules have been enacted to provide protection and 
incentives to private entrepreneurs. The investment 
incentives take three forms, fiscal incentives, 
competitive incentives and investment assistance.
Fiscal incentives include generous allowances for new 
buildings, plant and machinery. In Botswana these are 
provided under the Income Tax Act. Extra tax relief can 
be granted under a development approval order which 
specifies the types and rates of additional tax relief. 
In Zimbabwe fiscal incentives include a 100% special 
initial allowance in respect of commercial buildings if 
such buildings are industrial buildings. In Swaziland 
fiscal incentives include depreciation allowances, 
initial allowances and so-called pioneer incentives. 
Lesotho provides several incentives under the Income Tax 
Order. Further incentives are granted under the Lesotho 
Pioneer Industries Act of 1967 for approved 
manufacturers. Under the Act, an approved manufacturer 
can choose either (a) complete exemption from company 
income tax for the first six years of operation or (b) 
deduction of specified capital and other allowances for
purposes of taxation. Approved manufacturers are allowed
/
to deduct from their taxable income 145% of the cost of 
machinery and equipment and an immediate deduction of 75% 
of new building costs plus an additional 5% deduction 
during the*‘'next 20 years of operation.
Competitive incentives shield .approved investors from 
competitors. In Botswana it is possible for an investor
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to obtain an exclusive manufacturing licence for a 
specified project under the 1968 Industrial Development 
Act. The licence entitles the grantee to the exclusion of 
competition from other manufacturers for a renewable 
period of 4 years. In Zambia under the Industrial 
Development Act of 1977 preferential treatment with 
, respect to government purchasing is accorded to so-called 
priority enterprises.
Several governments in Southern Africa grant investment 
assistance to attract private entrepreneurs. In Botswana 
a number of incentives are made available under the 
Financial Assistance Policy which was launched in 1982. 
In Swaziland, the National Industrial Development 
Corporation (NIDCS) provides assistance for feasibility 
research, local coordination, factory construction and 
finance. Lesotho provides investment assistance in the 
form of free land for industrial development.
3.3 International Trade Agreements
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland <are members of the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with South Africa. 
The effect of the SACU is to integrate the economies of 
the BLS countries into the South African economy. The
integration dates back to 1910 when the Customs Union 
came into force. The dominant state has always been
South Africa. South Africa dictated the terms of the 
1910 Agreement. South Africa determined the external
customs tariff and the South African laws concerning 
rebates, refunds and prohibitions were applied to the BLS 
countries.
When the BLS countries attained formal' political 
independence, a new Customs Union Agreement was signed in 
1969. Article 2 of the Agreement states that goods 
grown, produced or- manufactured in the customs area are 
entitled to unimpeded flow among member states. Article
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4 provides that "the customs tariff and duties and the 
sales duties as in force in South Africa from time to 
time shall be applied to goods imported into the common 
customs." Thus the Agreement grants power to South 
Africa to unilaterally determine a common external tariff 
and rules out any internal barriers to trade within the 
customs area. The hegemonic role of South Africa is 
further entrenched by other provisions of the Agreement.
Article 8 (1) provides that the excise and sales duties 
in force in South Africa shall be applied to all goods 
originating in the customs area. Article 8 (2) states 
that rebates, refunds, or draw back of such duties shall 
also be identical to those in force in South Africa. 
According to Article 10 the laws in force in the BLS 
countries in connection with customs, excise and sales 
duty shall be similar to those in the Republic of South 
Africa.
In "recognition" of the unequal positions of the parties 
to the Agreement, there are provisons which seek to 
protect BLS industrial development from South African 
competition. For example Article 6 (1) permits BLS 
countries to impose additional duties on imported goods 
if such goods compete with locally manufactured goods, 
Article 7 allows the BLS countries to specify industries 
of major importance and once specified the South African 
authorities are denied the right to abolish or decrease 
the duties imposed on competing goods originating from 
without the customs union.
In terms of Article 19 member states are prohibited from 
entering into or amending a trade agreement with country 
outside the customs area in terms of which concessions on 
the duties in force in the customs union are granted to 
that other cpuntry. Members are likewise prohibited from 
entering into an agreement with a third country if such
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an agreement conflicts with the 1969 Agreement unless the 
consent of the other members has been obtained.
3.4 Monetary Agreements:-
The Rand Monetary Area
As a reflection of the close economic integration of the 
BLS economies and the South African economy, for decades 
the South African rand was the sole currency circulating 
in the BLS countries. There were no payments restrictions 
between the four countries and the commercial banks in 
the BLS countries were mere extensions of the South 
African banks. This state of affairs was formalised in 
1974 when the Rand Monetary Area Agreement was .signed. 
Botswana did not sign the agreement but opted to set up 
its own central bank and issue its own currency.
The “ Rand. Monetary Area Agreement consists of the 
following major elements:
1. The rand continued to circulate as the legal tender 
in Swaziland and Lesotho
2. The South African Reserve enjoys the exclusive right 
to manage the gold and foreign exchange reserves for 
the entire monetary area.
3. The Agreement provides for a free movement of funds 
within the monetary area.
4. Lesotho and Swaziland in effect surrendered power 
regarding monetary policy, balance of payments 
policies and exchange control.
3•5 International Tax Treaties
As an additional incentive to regional and international 
capital, states in Southern Africa have entered into
-11-
agreements for the avoidance of double taxation. For 
example, Botswana has concluded treaties with United 
Kingdom, Sweden and South Africa covering dividends,
' interest and royalties. Zimbabwe entered into a double 
taxation treaty with United Kingdom effective from 
October in 1982 in respect of -dividends, interest, 
royalities and management fees. Zambia has concluded 
Several double taxation agreements with other countries 
including Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, 
India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Malawi, 
Swaziland and Lesotho have also entered into a number of 
tax treaties covering dividends, interest, royalties and 
management fees.
3.6 Import-Export Regulations
The 9 member states of SADCC do not have a uniform policy 
regarding import/export regulations. As stated
previously there is no control of imports from, or 
exports to, the Southern African Customs Union Area with 
Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland. The BLS 
countries therefore have a free trade regime between them 
and South Africa. Further the BLS countries, though in 
theory require import licences in respect of non-SACU 
imports, in practice they are easily obtained. Malawi 
operates a ' fairly open import policy with few 
quantitative restrictions. Bedause the foreign exchange 
position of Malawi is not as good as that of the BLS 
countries, it does apply import regulation by quotas or 
other means to-* ration foreign exchange. Malawi has a 
preferential trade agreement with South Africa and has 
developed close trading links with that country though 
not to the same degree of intimacy as the BLS countries. 
Zimbabwe has been operating import, regulation with an 
import licensing system and has a limited preferential 
agreement with South Africa. Due to the war situation, 
Angola does not trade with South Africa and it operates a
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strict import licence system which 'has reduced imports of 
luxury items. Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia operate a 
strict foreign trade regime. Foreign exchange, which is 
in short supply, is allocated according to a fixed set of 
priorities.
3.7 Investment Protection, Expropriation and Dispute 
Settlement
Domestic Constitutional Protection
The Constitutions of most Southern African states have 
provisions which outlaw expropriation of private 
property. For example, the 1966 Botswana Constitution 
prohibits compulsory acquisition of property unless such 
acquisition is shown to be in the public interest and 
prompt compensation is paid. An aggrieved party has 
direct access to the High Court for determination of the 
legality of the compulsory acquisition and the amount of 
compensation.
Furthermore, the compensation is freely remittable within 
a "reasonable" time. ,
3.8 International Treaty Protection
Southern African states have signed and ratified the 1965 
World Bank Convention on Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. 
For example the Convention came into force for Botswana 
op 14 February 1970 and was enacted by the 1970 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (Convention) Act. 
Swaziland ratified the Convention and it entered into 
force for Swaziland on 14 July 1971. Lesotho, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe are also signatories to the Convention.
f
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4, REGIONAL/INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL AND TECHNOLOGY IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA: THE DOMINANCE OF TRANSNATIONALS
In response to the colonial and post-colonial framework 
in Southern Africa, transnationals have become major 
actors on the Southern African scene. The first 
significant transnational penetration of Southern Africa 
was Cecil Rhodes' British Africa Company. The impact of 
this company on the then Northern and Southern Rhodesia 
on their colonisation was, without doubt, far reaching.
In the wake of Cecil Rhodes came the mining 
transnationals. The Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) and
the Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST) started the/exploitation of the Coperbelt. Powell Duffryn opened up 
Wankie but Was subsequently taken over by AAC in 1953. 
Rio Tinto and Lonrho were also active in starting mining 
activities of the then Southern Rhodesia. In Botswana 
RST and AAC started the Selebi-Phikwe copper-nickel mine 
while De Beers exploited Botswana's diamond mines 
originally at Orapa but of late also in J,waneng. It was 
the same De Beers which developed the diamond mines of 
Namibia and Lesotho.
In addition to predominance in the mining industry, 
transnationals have controlled other sectors including 
banks, agriculture and manufacturing.
For example an examination of the ownership trends in 
Botswana manufacturing from 1979 to 1984 (Table. 1) 
confirms a constant expansion of international and 
regional capital. The profile 'of the Botswana formal 
manufacturing sector for 1984 (Table 2) also illustrates 
the dominant role of international and regional capital.
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Ownershlp Trends In Botswana Manufacturing 1979-84
1979 • 1984
Ownership no. of 
firms
% no. of 
firms
%
Batswana
/
15 17,0 32 15,3
Joint Venture 26 29,5 55 26,3
Foreign 47 53,4 122 58,4
Total 88 100,0 209 100,0
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry
/
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Tbble 2
Profile of the Formal Manufacturing Sector 1984
Number of Establishments Operating Labour Force
—  A..—  —  —  — ■! ■ —  —  — ■ —  —
Subsector Botswana Mixed Foreign Total Local Foreign
Meat & meat products - 1 1 2 1,956 41
Dairy & Agro-based '
products 1 4 3 8 46 9
Beverages 1' 7 5 13 579 27
Bakery products 3 3 7 13 377 . 20
\
Textiles 8 8 32 48 2,432 87
Tanning & Leather products - 4 3 7 419 23
Chemical & Rubber products - 2 14 16 393 • 32
Wood & wooden products 1 6 5 12 448 22
Paper & paper products - 2 4 6 238 22
Metal products 9 7 21 37 1,490 • 79,
Building materials '7 4 15 26 1,063 38
Plastics 1 3 4 8 262 16
Electrical ^ ; 1 3 . 6 10 318\ 33
Handicrafts 1 2 3 52 4
Total 32 55 122
✓ \ 
209 10,073 453
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
At the regional level, the hegemonic position of 
transnationals in ..the Key sectors of the economies of 
Southern Africa states was revealed by a relatively 
recent study by eminent economist Ann Seidman. [Table 3]
liable 3 Transnational Corporate Boaination of fn— nfllng Heights of Economies of South Africa's neighbours in 1974
(Prior to Liberation of Portugues Colonies)
rpswinding heights
Neighbouring countries
Nanihia Botswana Lesotho Swaziland Zinbabwe
Barclays, Standard,
French Bank
Barclays, Standard Barclays, Standard Barclays, Standard Barclays. Standard
National. Grindlays. 
Nedsual (70S)
Basic Industries 
Major nines Uranian
Rio Tinto Zinc 
Copper
Anglo Aoerican ■ 
AMAX, New wont, 
Falconbridge 
Bianonds 
Be Beers
Bianonds 
Be Beers 
Copper-nickel 
Anglo American 
AMAX (Goyeranent 
15? share)
Iron ore 
Anglo Anerican 
Asbestos 
Turner*. Babcock 
Newell
Iren A Steel 
British Steel (33^)
Coal, copper, nickel, iron
Anglo Aueyican
Crone
Union Carbide 
Rio Tinto Zinc 
Phspahte 
AECI
Major estates/ 
Agro-industry
(Primary settler 
farns)
Lonrho Tate A Lyle 
Bel Monte Nestles
Lonrho; BAT: Tate A 
Lyle; Anglo Anerican 
Brboke Bond-Leibig
Foreign and 
Internal Wholesale 
Trade
All inports and exports handled by South African and Transnational finis within the South 
African Custom Union. All inports/exports go through South Africa, 
Mosanbique
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(Table j cont.)
Commanding heights'
Neighbouring countries
Malawi Zambia Angola Mozambique
Banks Barclays and Standard 
own 495 and manage 
commercial bank: 
Government owns 515
Barclays, Standard 
National, Grindlays 
conduct 80-905 of 
bank business
Barclays, Standard and' 
Anglo American held shares 
in Banco Standard-Totla 
Alliance (a Portugues bank)
Standard and Anglo American 
held shares in Banco Standard 
Totla Mozambique 
(a Portugues bank)
Basic Industries
Major mines None Copper
Anglo American^ AMAX 
(in partnership with 
Government, 515)
Oil
Gulf Oil; Texaco 
t
Diamonds
De Beers and Portugues
Iron ore
Krupp
None
Major estates 
Agro-industrv
Lonrho Tate and Lyle (in part­
nership with Government)
Anglo American
Foreign and Internal 
Wholesale Trade
\
36? of Imports from 
South Africa, unknown 
£ from Zimbabwe
CBC (UK 495: Zambia 
Government 515);
ZOK (formerly South 
African taken by 
government 1005)
Portugues interests handled 
imports: transnational 
mines/agricultural business 
handled much of exports
Portugues inte’rests handled 
trade, with growing South 
African and transnational 
involvement. . >
ifroir. Seidmar.. "Benefits to Botswana from Regional Integration in Ootnen et al Botswana's Economy since Independence 19§3)
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The 1986 SADCC Macro-Economic Survey confirmed that
throughout the SADCC region transnationals exercised
"significant though varying degrees of control over the
mining sector". According to this survey, transnationals
exercised control not only through ownership (on the
basis of equity and/or loans) but also through technology . ■ / ' 
ranging from inputs to the extra-active phase, processing
and refining. The survey observed thatf control was also
exerted through provision of managerial and technical
services. ;
Summing up the negative consequences of dependence on 
• foreign capital and technology the Survey concludes:
K"-- Control tlj^ »ugh equity and loans is measurable. In
some countries, governments are minority shareholders, 
allowing foreign partners a stake of 70 to 75 percent. In 
other countries there is equal shareholding (50 percent 
each), or. foreign minority shareholding. But at 50 
percent or 49 percent, the foreign shareholder often 
exercises considerable control, especially if he is also 
a creditor to the company.
3.8 Dependence on foreign capital impecfes the development of 
independent business policy since multinationals are only 
interested in thosel fields that provide them with 
stable, cheap and unprocessed materials for their 
industries ' abroad. By imposing this condition, they 
constrain the balanced exploitation of regional mineral 
resources, limit the creation of downstream industries
, and thus hamper general development.
Foreign Technology ' ' 1
' " ■ (
3.9 Deeply tied to foreign capital is dependence on foreign 
technology. This technology is often made available tp
-19-
mining industries in the region at extremely high cost. 
With the long-term worsening of the terms of trade, the 
importation of technology not only creates one more link 
of dependence, but also reduces the profitablility of 
mining. ----"
*
South Africa capital commands a significant share of 
foreign capital in Southern African economies especially 
in the BLS coutries, Zimbabwe, Malawi and to a lesser 
extent,in Mozambique and Zambia where South Africa has a 
more limited ownership control. The predominant role of 
South African capital is underlined by statistics which 
Show that South Africa accounts for around 7% of the 
SADCC countries' total exports and, as much as 30% of 
their combined imports {Table 4].
■ »
/
Table 4
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Direction of Trade for the 9 SADCC coutrles, 1982° 
Percentage distribution off'
Export to: Imports from:SADDC PTA.
nos*
RSA SADCC PTA.
nes*
RSA
Angola 0.1 _ 0.8 0.0 —
Botswana 11.9 . 0.1 11.3 6.3 0.1 85.1
Lesotho 0.1 0.0 41.3 0.1 0.0 97.1
Malawi 9.7 1.1 5.7 9.6 0.4 34.0
Mozambique 11.6 7.8 1.8 3.0 0.2 8.1
Swaziland 2.7 1.1 36.9 0.7 0.1 82.9
Tanzania 0.8 2.9 — 4.2 1.8 -
Zambia 3.5 0.2 0.3 6.3 0.4 14.5
Zimbabwe 11.5 0.7 17.1 7.6 0.0 22.1
SADCC-Total 5.0. 0.9 7.0 4.4 0.3 30.2
SADCC-Total 276
[in mill. USD]
47 382 316 24 2161
♦PTA.nex signifies the non-SADCC PTA countries, including the 
2 potential members [Madagascar and the Seychelles].
°1982 was the year for which the most complete datc^ was ✓ 
available.
There have been no significant changes since.
The total amount of SADCC import/export trade with South 
Africa is in sharp contrast to the intra SADCC trade [Table 5]
Table 5
Intra-SADCC trade, 1982-84 average [estimates]
Country Imports [1] Exports [2]
Mill.USD % Mill. USD %
Angola 12 4.3 2 0.8
Botswana 51 18.5 47 19.2
Lesotho 0.3 0.1 0 0.0
Malawi 26 9.4 21 8.6
Mozambique 26 9.4 14 5.7
Swaziland 3 1.1 7 2.9
Tanzania 24 8.7 4 1.6
Zambia 48 17.4 35 14.3
Zimbabwe 86 31.2 115 46.9
Total 276 100.1 245 100.0
1. As reported by the importing country. 
\ 2. As reported by the exporting country.
(Tables 4 and 5 were adopted from SADCC Inter-Regional Trade, 
Mmegi wa Dikgang 16 & 23 August 1986)
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The degree and significance of South African originating 
multinational activity in Southern Africa, is also emphasized 
by evidence of the extent to which the growth of exports to 
the BLS countries contributes heavily to South Africa's 
industrial output and employment growth [Table 6].
Table 6
Direct Effect of Botswana's Manufcttiring Imports from RSA 
~ on RSA Manufacturing GDP (1970-797
Year Botswana's Botswana's Change in \ Change in RSA
manufacturing manufacturing Botswana's manufacturing
imports from imports from manufacturing. GDP equivalent
RSA (R millions RSA (R millions, imports from of column 4
current prices ■1970 prices) RSA (R millions (R millions
1970 prices) 1970 prices)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1970 28.0 28.0 _
1971 36.4 34.7 6.7 2.3 -
1972 49.2 43.9 9.2 3.1
1973 63.1 48.5 4.6 ' 1.6
1974 79.5 54.2 5.7 1.9
1975 101.1 57.4 3.2 1.1
1976 119.5 56.9 -0.5 -0.2
1977 152.6 64.3 7.4 2.5
1978 212.4 86.2 21.9 7.4
1979 294.2 103.4 17.2 5.8
Total 1136.0 577.5 75.4 25.5
[Table 6 was adopted from E.L. McFarland, "Benefits to RSA of her Exports to BLS" 
in Ocmen et al, Botswana's Economy since Independence 1983] .
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5. SOUTHERN AFRICAN RESPONSE
\
During the last 8 to 10 years Black Southern African 
states have initiated a variety of measures geared to the 
reduction of dependence on South Africa. The core of 
these measures has been transport and trade. In the area 
of tirade the strategy has been the development of trade 
links and the strengthening of a technological base. The 
thrust of this strategy proceeded on the basis of 
bilateral arrangements as opposed to a free trade zone 
approach. This response has, however, been bedevilled by 
a- number of constraints. These have included the 
hegemonic position of South Africa within SACU and RMAy 
the limited national markets, major differences in 
national strategies to development, limited national 
capacities to overcome technology stratification and the 
impotence of national regimes in controlling
international mobility of transnationals.
5.1 Southern African Custom and Monetary Union
South Africa and South African based transnationals have 
used the regime of the Custom Union to assert their 
superiority and to frustrate efforts of the BLS countries 
to develop and control an independent technological base. 
The Customs Agreement has provisons "designed" to protect 
the BLS industries and thus stimulate industrialization 
and technological sophistication within the BLS
countries. As stated earlier Articles 6 (1) and 7 permit 
the levying of additional protective duties and
specification of major industries by the BLS countries. 
Notwithstanding the existence of these provisions minimal 
industrial activity has been stimulated 'and advanced 
technology remains the privilege of South Africa in 
• general and transnationals in particular.
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2 Limited National Markets
Against the background of a legacy of dependence upon 
South Africa, thfe. creation of SADCC was welcomed as, an 
opportunity for overcoming the constraints of small 
national markets.I
For example in Botswana, apart from th^ constraints posed 
by the membership of SACU, the existence of a viable- 
market has always been perceived as the most pressing 
obstacle against the development of a substantial 
technological base. Upon the creation of SADCC, several 
manufacturing concerns were set up with a view to 
exploiting ' the new opportunities. Prior to SADCC, 
industrial and major "technological activities were
ilimited to the Botswana Meat 'Commission and Kgalagadi 
Breweries but in the early eighties industrial production 
in particular and advanced technological activity in 
general have undergone a major expansion. A significant 
proportion of the recent growth has been geared to the 
SADCC export ljiarkets especially Zimbabwe. The prospects 
in this regard would however, appear to be dim given the 
1985 Zimbabwe trade regulations "as part of the new 
Customs and Excise Act. According to press reports in 
Botswana, the consequences for Botswana based
manufacturers/exporters were quite adverse. By being 
shut out of the Zimbabwe market and given the foreign 
exchange problems of other potential SADCC markets, the 
Botswana based industrialists were back 'to the pre-SADCC 
limited domestic market.
Regarding the problems of small markets, the 1985 SADCC 
Survey made the following observations:
>■ v
"--  The SADCC member countries taken individually are in
many cases too small to constitute a market for efficient
—  \ '
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industrial production in many product categories. The 
problem of a small- market size is of particular concern 
to Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Malawi. Because of 
its much broader range of products to soqie extent 
Zimbabwe has faced similar concerns. Competition of 
goods from South Africa make tl^ e setting of most 
industries in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland and of some 
in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia difficult. In the 
remaining four countries (Zambia, Tanzania, Angola and 
Mozambique), supply bottlenecks have tended to overshadow 
demand problems (as has also been the case for much of 
Zimbabwe's industrial sector) and it is apparent that the 
market size problems • could re-emerge after present 
critical supply constraints have been Overcome >--— "
5.3 Major Differences In National Development Planning
Writers on regional cooperation have identified 
ideological difference between the affected states as a 
major source of dissensus. In the content of SADCC
tr
ideological differences have not come to "the fore as a 
disintegrating force. This has especially been true as 
regards the core of SADCC, that is to say transport and 
communications. The exp^n^ion . forv th^s, 1 iea,. ip the 
perception of transport ana communTcations^as'"* being 
largely non-political. The same cannot be said of trade 
and economic relationships. The history of SADCC would 
seem to support the view that economics is treated as 
high politics leading to major bottlenecks in
. implementing cooperative ventures in general and the 
articulation of uniform policies to deal with 
transnationals. In this content, one would expect an' 
easier task in designing and implementingx a common 
approach on the part of Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola. 
These three countries have pursued a policy of
dismantling the colonial capitalist economies. To this
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end they have nationalised large enterprises, created 
state corporations and maintained close surveilance over 
the transnationals. Consistent with this approach 
Angola, Mozambique and .Tanzania have operated trade 
regimes which have sought to limit imports. In contrast 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia operate 
fairly open trade regimes characterised by strong 
investment incentives and open import policies.
Zimbabwe is in a class of its own lying somewhere between 
the above two extremes. Nevertheless ZANU-PF has stated 
that it. intends to lead Zimbabwe in a transition' to 
socialist relations of production.
The lack of a -uniform policy regarding development 
planning in general and trade policy in particular can 
only render futile attempts to control transnationals by 
national regimes. By pursuing national policies in 
isolation, Southern African states leave themselves open/ 
to manipulation by, transnationals. To the extent that 
transnationals can relocate from one SADCC state to 
another and as transantionals become more mobile, SADCC 
states will fail to achieve a significant measure of 
control over transnationals through the use of national 
programmes.
The functional limitations of national regimes were; quite 
eloquently illustrated by the experience of the Andean 
Pact. Chile, Peru and Colombia all virtually honoured the 
Pact more in breach than in observance. The
transnationals originally adopted a very hostile attitude 
against the Pact but they subsequently left the divisions 
among the member states to blunt the sharp edges of the 
treaty. The same fate cannot be ruled out in respect of 
SADCC states.
\
5.4 Access to, and Control of, Technology
In the struggle by the Southern African states to reduce 
external depends on South Africa the question of access 
and control of advanced technology is critical. Without 
an elaborate technological , and organisational 
infrastructure, the promises of independent development 
are unlikely to materialise. Yet as an accelerated 
creation of an independent technological base is the pre­
requisite to genuine independerice, access and control of 
technology poses political problems.
The process of technology production and distribution can 
be characterized as a process of interaction involving a 
vvariety of actors endowed with differing capabilities, 
the major actors being nation states and transantional 
corporations. In this process the transnationals have an 
upper hand thanks to the benefits conferred by the legal 
infrastructure and their control over R & D, capital and 
other resources. ' The process of interaction results in a 
‘ sharp disparity between the, participants with black 
Southern Africa existing as ' a peripheral economy. The 
present distribution patterns cannot, however, be altered 
without changes being effected in the "functional .grid" 
of the process. In this context "functional grid" is 
used to as an expression to suggest that the legal 
infrastructure operates as a key mechanism that regulates 
access and control of, technology. In short, access to 
and control of, technology are determined by the nature 
of the legal system.
The role of law will, therefore, be critical for the
purpose of changing the "functional grid" of technology
production and distribution. However,, in order to effect
such a change one has to recognize that the law as‘ an
instrument which is affected by the power process ^ it is*
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a process by which some people control other people and 
resources. It is, therefore, not a mere rigid set of 
rules but rather a process of authoritative decision in 
which, patterns of authority and control are appropriately 
conjoined. In this context control means the making of 
policy choices and decisions which are in fact put into 
effect in a consequential manner.
If SADCC states are to succeed in breaking the existing 
stratification in terms of access to advanced technology, 
the requisite amount of power will have to be deployed 
and therein lies the crux of the matter.
The unfavourable position of black Southern Africa 
regarding science and technology is not peculiar to this 
region. To challenge the transnationals' proprietary 
rights over technology amounts to challenging what is 
perceived by the owners to be the underpinning of 
industrial capitalism and its ideological handmaiden, 
economic liberalism.
At the international level effective powr has been 
particularly crucial in questions relating to science and 
technology. > This has been due to the fact that, as 
Tinbergen and others have concluded,, Third World 
countries have largely depended upon multinational 
corporations for acquiring and expanding/ their 
technological capacities and that the growth of 
transnationals, which have been a major force in shaping 
the world economy, has been a phenomenon associated with 
Western industrial capitalism. In the,late 70s of the 
largest transnationals, 638 were headquartered in North 
America, Western Europe or Japan. The largest 300 US 
enterprises and their foreign subsidiaries alone 
accounted for 28 per cent of global exports, including 44 
per cent of primary products and 2 per cent of
/
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manufacturing . At the end of the last decade it was
predicted that without changes in the trends of the 70s, 
transnationals could possibly control more than 40 per 
cent of the world's production by 1980. It was expected 
that in light of such factors as the increasing role of 
scientific expertise, the ability to form capital needed 
to, underwrite major technological innovations, and the 
disproportionate control by transnationals of marketing 
knowledge and specialisation in transnational decision 
making, there was a real possibility that transnationals 
would in the future enjoy increased rather than decreased 
control.
The experience of Southern Africa especially in the case 
of the BLS countries has confirmed the foregoing 
predictions. in the .exploitation of mineral resources, 
Southern Africa has increasingly relied on the 
transnationals. The mining and treatment of mineral 
products requires large capital investments and involves 
high risks which individual nation-states cannot 
mobilise. In the event they have been forced to rely on 
the mining transnationals and external financing.
6. CONCLUSION
The underlying premise of SADCC initiatives is that the
existing international and regional economic and trade-
cum-technology regimes- perpetuates a division of" labour
in which the Southern African states predominantly export
primary commodities in exchange for industrial goods.
This pattern constrains Southern African opportunities
for integrated economic development by stunting growth of
their technological base in general and industiral
4*sectors in particular. The SADCC iniatives seek to
A.upgrade the technological capacity of the member states 
through a restructuring of the regional international
/
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division of labour. • The restructuring would have to 
entail a partial disengagement from trade ties with South 
Africa and increasing trade and technological exchanges 
internal to SADCC. .
The pertinent question is whether SADCC can change the 
existing regional and international system as it affects 
the member states in a way that markedly differs from the 
dominant ideology in the centres of regional and 
international power. Consequently change would consist 
of something much more than formal legal changes such as 
the adoption of a SADCC sponsored code of conduct on 
transnationals and . the transfer of technology. Such 
formal changes have to be coordinated with control. In 
other words, legal changes in the regional or 
international systems as they relate to access to, and 
control of, advanced technology can only be effected
through either a forcible redistribution of control or/the concurrence of the transnationals and/or the centres 
of industrial capitalism and power. In isolated instances 
transnationals may voluntarily give up their monopoly 
rights otherwise by and large they will hold on to their 
positions in the hopes of utilising their industrial 
power - which is the cutting edge in the division of all 
things in great demand and short supply in collective 
life - to maintain the status quo.
The other possibility is for black Southern Africa to 
assert a forcible redistribution. What would be the 
chances of success? ,
An examination of the constraints and possibilities leads 
to the following conclusions. The SADCC objectives and. 
strategies are tp a certain incompatible. SADCC 
countries would find it difficult simultaneously to 
pursue a non-conventional integration strategy and at the
■ r
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same time muster a collective# central authority to 
offset market forces and effectively regulate 
transnational operations. SADCC seeks to partially 
disengage economically from South Africa without 
displaying the requisite political will to forego a 
degree of sovereignty which is a prerequisite to the 
development of supranational institutions that are 
necessary for the effective restructuring of the existing 
division of labour. In short they wish to eat their case 
and have it at the same time.-
Second there is a possibility that the potential benefits 
realized by SADCC will not be equally distributed among 
its members * in such a way as to create core - periphery 
trade and economic relationships among the SADCC member 
states. This tendency would not be peculiar to SADCC an<*
- - s'was anticipated during SADCC I.
The SADCC I Document thus stated:
<
"The first main problem with common markets or customs
union is the growth of1 regional inequalities, i.e.
(
regional distribution of benefits and " costs of 
cooperation. Unless mechanisms can be developed to offset 
differential gains and losses, there will, inevitably, be 
pressures created in the less well-off countries to opt 
out of the agreement and to seek an alternative status 
that will improve their position. A basic requirement, 
therefore, for this degree of cooperation is political, 
that the participating states be prepared to forego a 
degree of autonomy in decision-taking for the common good 
of all partner states, and the political will exists on 
the part of the states who bentefit most from the union to 
develop mechanisms to transfer part of their benefits to 
the not-so-fortunate countries."
/
V /
This is collaborated by studies on Third World 
integration. For example Mytla and Axline argue that the 
tendency of economic integration to produce asymetical 
distribution patterns acts as a centrifugal force. In 
order to counter the centrifugal forces there must be a 
strong commitment toward collective actipn/solidarity. 
The solidarity and .collectivity will, however, be 
undermined unless there is an agreement regarding the 
distribution of benefits.
More specifically, in the context of SADCC, Zimbabwe as 
the more industrially advanced and economically more 
diversified (thus the dominant state, and economy) would 
be in a better position to benefit from a SADCC reduction 
of dependence upon RSA.
If this was to occur, it would set in motion centrifugal 
forces which would undermine the commitment to a :unified
' Iapproach. Therefore in order to forestall this a prior 
agreement regarding the apportioning of the benefits 
would be called for. The stability of such an agreement 
would however require the assumption of the leadership 
mantle. The assumption of the role of economic leader 
invariably carries with it the ' making of national 
sacrifices and provisioh of international or regional 
public (free) goods and services to the less powerful
lmembers. . In sum, Zimbabwe would subsidize the less 
economically powerful members.
Finally it is worth noting that if the SADCC initiative 
succeeded in reducing dependence upon South Africa this 
would entail losses for the RSA. Given the significance 
of the RSA/SADCC inter-state trade we may then expect 
counter initiatives by RSA. Recent evidence of economic 
and military destabilization would confirm the view that
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RSA will be willing to frustrate SADCC Disengagement 
programmes.
Mozambique and Angola have in the past received the brunt 
of RSA destabilization. The 1986 SADCC Macro-Economic 
Survey concluded that as a result of destabilization and 
aggression in Angola and Mozambique, resources have been 
transferred from industry, supportive structure/have been 
destroyed and transport links disrupted. We can
therefore expect similar counter-initiatives, by RSA 
against the rest of SADCC.
, *****
\
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